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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
MOLLERUI) V ~\N LINES,
a corporation, and
Lll~ERTY l\1UTUAL INSURANCE
C()MPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, TYVEN ADAMS,
\VASATCH CONSTRUCTION
C()MPANY, and THE STATE
INSURANCE FUND,
Defendants.

Case No.

10101

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT, STATE INSURANCE
FUND OPPOSING PLAINTIFFS' PETITION
FOR REHEARING
This brief is written in response to Plaintiff's
Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing.

POINT I.
THE COURT'S DECISION IS IN HARMONY
''YITH ITS EARLIER DECISIONS.
Plaintiff's Brief discusses at length the theory
that the last employer is responsible for an aggravation of a previous existing condition. We do not dispute this argument if there is under consideration
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a matter involving "aggravation" as there are numerous cases which so hold. However, it appears
that the Plaintiffs in this case confuse the aggravation of a pre-existing condition with a reoccurrence of an injury. These two conditions are
entirely different. The aggravation of a pre-existing
condition assumes that there has been a fixed condition and that thereafter a new injury occurs which
adds to the disability which was then and there existing. In reoccurrence cases the condition is different.
A reoccurrence involves a reoccurring or extension
of the disability and difficulty which had its beginning at the time of the original accident.
Plaintiff's Brief in Support of the Petition for
Rehearing (PB3) takes the position that the Court's
decision in this case is in direct conflict with its
earlier decisions on the question as to which employer
is liable for the aggravation of a previous injury.
\Ve submit that this is not a case of an aggravation
of a pre-existing condition, but it is a case involving
the reopening of a case by the Con1mission after
there has been discovered a change in the condition
of the injured workman.
The jurisdiction and power of the Industrial
Commission to make modifications or changes in
its former orders is set forth in Section 35-1-78:
"The powers and jurisdiction of the Commission over each case shall be continuing,
and it may from tin1e to time make such modifications or changes with respect to its former
findings, or orders with respect thereto, as
in its opinion may be justified."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

It is clear that the Con11nission in this case considered the condition of the claimant to be such that
there \Vas a continuing process of deterioration making it necessary to l'eopen the Mollerup case. Claims
ha ,.P been reopened by the Commission on numerous
occasions, and its decisions to do so has been sustained by the Supreme Court.
In Barber Asphalt Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 103 U. 371, 135 P. 2d. 266, the medical advisory
board had 1nade a rating of 5 Cfo disability. The claimant, Leonard Cook would not accept the rating, but
at a later date did enter into a release with his
etnployer and its insurance carrier upon the payment
of compensation for 15 ~lo permanent partial disability. More than one year later, Cook filed a claim
for additional compensation claiming to be totally
disabled. Even though in this case there had been
a release signed by the claimant, the Industrial Commission held that the case could be reopened and
the clain1ant was found to be totally disabled. This
award was sustained by the Supreme Court.
Although we mentioned this case in our earlier
brief we feel that it is important to again discuss
it in order to direct this Court's attention to its
earlier decisions which affirm the right and the
duty of the Industrial Comn1ission to reopen a claim
and to grant additional compensation or benefits
'vhen such seems to be necessary in order to accomplish the spirit of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has clearly
emphasized this right and duty on the part of the
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Commission when it said In the Barber case, at
270 P.:
"This Court has frequently held that a
case may be reopened by the Commission if
there has been a change of condition of the
injured workman or if there has been some
new development which shows the former
award to be either inadequate or excessive.
If an injured party fails to heal as had been
expected at the time the award was made,
such fact is a "new development" so as to give
the Commission jurisdiction to entertain an
application for additional compensation."
Several cases are also cited which support the
same doctrine.
One of the earlier cases which discusses the
effect to be given to the language of this section,
which was then known as Section 3144 is Utah Apex

Mining Company, et al. v. Industrial Commission,
298 P. 381. The Court said at 382 P. the following:
"If the Commission be required to determine the amount of compensation that shall
be paid before the extent of the injury becomes
certain and fixed, the employee may receive
more or he may receive less than he is justly
entitled to under the Industrial or Workmen's
Compensation Act. It was evidently to lessen
or avoid the probability of such injustice that
the provision granting the Commission continuing jurisdiction was enacted. In this case
Dr. Critchlow believed that Butler's condition would be improved if he would go to work.
Butler was anxious to work rather than try
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to eke out an existence on the a1nount of compensation awarded to him. Under such circumstances we can conceive of no legal reason
why he should be deprived of further compensation in the event that after a fair trial he
found that he was unable to work. Butler's
application for additional compensation was
in no sense the beginning of a new proceeding, but was merely another step in the proceeding instituted by the filing of the original
application. Chebot v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 106 Or. 660, 212 P. 792.
The Commission had not made a final disposition of the cause, but on the contrary expressly retained jurisdiction thereof. This the
Commission had the right and power to do
under the law granting it continued jurisdiction."
This same section is discussed in Spencer v.
Industrial Commission, 4 U. 2d. 185, 290 P. 2d. 692.
In respect to Plaintiff's argun1ent that the doctrine
of res judicata should apply in this case inasmuch
as the applicant was awarded a 5ro disability settlement soon after he was injured while he was working for Mollerup this Court said the following in the
Spencer case:
"We are not concerned here with the
merits of the decisions just referred to but
this much is unquestionably true : The' doctrine of res judicata as applicable to court
procedure is not in a strict sense applicable
t? proceedings before the Industrial CommisSion.
"It is not to be assumed from the above
that an applicant can re-apply to the Commis-
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sion for a new determination upon the same
facts merely because he may be dissatisfied
with its former order, any more than it means
that a defendant in such a proceeding could
so do. The act provides that a party aggrieved
by the action of the Commission may apply
for a rehearing or seek a review in this court
within times prescribed by law."
The court went on further to say:
"In view of the express terms of the statute hereinabove referred to, and the adjudicated cases supporting the idea of continuing
jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission,
there can be no doubt that once the application has been filed, and the Commission's
jurisdiction invoked, it has authority to entertain further proceedings to deal with any
substantial changes or unexpected developments that may arise as a result of the injury."
This court found against the claimant in the
Spencer case because the testimony proffered was
not sufficient to compel a finding that the old 1941
injury was the cause of the disability Spencer
claimed to be suffering in 1954, but the case does
set forth the recent views of this Court as to the
continuing jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission to act under the authority of Section 35-1-78,
U.C.A. 1953. It is our position that the Industrial
Commission, in the case now before this court, had
justification and authority under the said section
to hold that Tyven Adams condition related back
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7
to the industrial injury he received while working
for Mollerup.
The Commission after the hearing, at which
Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook, Chairman of the Medical
Panel testified, entered its Order and in the Order
stated that it accepted the testimony of Dr. Holbrook, and the finding of the Panel which was :
" ( 1) This man's present condition represents a continuation of the injury of April 9,

1958, and the subsequent minor accidents have
not been significant in the overall progress of
his condition since that injury."
The Commission's Order was based upon adequate, and competent testimony.

POINT II.
THE RULE OF RES JUDICATA IS NOT
APPLICABLE.

\\"e have discussed this point in connection with
our discussion of Point I, but we wish to make the
following additional comments:
This court, in rendering its decision in this case
no\v under consideration, was fully aware of the
arguments made by the Plaintiff's counel as to the
nlle of res judicata and the inherent powers in the
Industrial Commission by reason of Section 35-1-78,
U.C.A., 1953, when it said in the main opinion:
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"The ordinary rule of res judicata is not
applicable to the instant proceeding. Inherent
in the act is recognition that industrial
injuries cannot always be diagnosed with
absolute accuracy, nor their consequences predicted with complete certainty. Sections 351-78, U.C.A., 1953 provides that "the powers
and jurisdiction of the Commission over each
case shall be continuing, and it may from
time to time make such modification or change
with respect to former findings, or others
with respect thereto, as in its opinion may be
justified." Accordingly even though the Commission has made an award, if there later
develops some substantial change or new development with respect to the injury than was
known or was contemplated at the time of
the original award, upon proper proceedings
the Commission can make such adjustment
as is just and reasonable and in conformity
with the act.''
We therefore submit that this argument has
been fully and carefully considered by this court.

POINT III.
ADAMS' PHYSICAL i\ILMENTS WERE
NOT CAUSED BY THE INCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED WHILE HE WAS WORKING FOR
WASATCH.
May we again direct the Court's attention to
the testimony which puts to rest the argument that
there was anything of a substantial nature in the
way of an injury which occurred while Tyven Adams
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was working for Wasatch Construction Company.
HP rnerely stepped off the tongue of the scraper
which was about two or three feet high into some
sand or dust. He did not fall, but remained standing. ( R-15).
'Vhat occurred at that tin1e was certainly nothing of great consequence. What happened was considered by the medical panel and the conclusion was
reacherl that this minor event was not the cause of
the clain1ant's difficulties.
The fact that he experienced so1ne pain after
stepping off the tongue was not unusual because
Adams had been experiencing pain prior to the time
that he went to work for Wasatch Construction Company. On October 15th he saw Dr. Eddington in
Lehi and reported to the doctor that he was having
considerable pain across the lower back and down
his legs. The evidence of this is found in a letter
written by the doctor to the Industrial Commission
dated October 22, 1962 which was before the claimed
''rasatch accident which occurred on October 27,
1962. It should be observed that Dr. Eddington's
letter written prior to the Wasatch Construction
Con1pany accident suggested to the Industrial Commission that his case be reopened. (R-11)
This evidence clearly illustrates that the Plaintiff was experiencing a great deal of difficulty prior
to the time he was employed by Wasatch.
The Plaintiff testified that he had gone to see
Dr. Eddington about his back prior to the time he
went to work for Wasatch. (R-20).
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The incident which occurred while the Claimant was working for Wasatch was aparently not
serious and his condition had not changed much as
he continued working for about a month thereafter
and did not see a doctor until about December 6th.
(R-41, 42).
POINT IV.
THE MAKOFF DECISION IS NOT IN CONFLICT.
There is no conflict between the decision rendered by this Court in the case now under consideration and the Makoff decision, Makoff Company v.
Industrial Comntission, 13 U. 2d. 23, 368 P. 2d. 70.
In that case the Industrial Commission after considering the report of the Medical Advisory Board
and the testimony of the Applicant which pointed
to the fact that the Applicant had, while working
for Makoff, sustained such an injury to his back in
the 1957 accident that he was able to do only light
work from that time on and found that the 1957
industrial accident aggravated the previous condition. In the case now before this court the conclusion
of the medical panel and the finding of the Commission was that it was the original accident which occurred while the Applicant was working for Moilerup was the cause of the physical disability. The medical panel apparently concluded that this was not
a case of aggravation, but was a case of a reoccurrence of the old injury, and that the incidents which
occurred in between were incidental thereto and
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were not the underlying reason for the Applicant's
present condition. As it did in the Makoff case, the
Industrial Cotnmission properly gave consideration
to the finuings and report of the medical panel in
reaching its conclusion. This was properly done and
such procedure was contemplated by the enactment
of the statute setting up the medical panel.

POINT V.
NOTHING NEW HAS BEEN PRESENTED
BY THE PLAINTIFF.
The arguments presented by the Plaintiffs in
their Brief in support of their Petition for Rehearing
are the san1e as were presented by the Plaintiffs in
their original brief. Nothing new has been presented
by the Plaintiffs in the Petition for Rehearing. All
matters discussed in their Brief were considered by
this Court. In addition thereto the same matters
\vere presented to the Court by oral argument, so it
cannot be said that the court did not, at the time
this decision was rendered, consider the points now
made by the Plaintiffs.
In the old case entitled In Re: Proceedings to
Disbat, JlacKnight, Attorney, 4 U. 237, 9 Pac. 573
this Court stated :
"We have many times held that, to justify a rehearing, a strong case must be made.
'Ve must be convinced, either that the Court
failed to consider some material point in the
case or that it erred in its conclusions, or that
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some matter has been discovered which was
unknown when the case was argued."
The record is clear and complete in this case
and none of the elements are present as set forth
above, which would compel the court to grant a rehearing.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion we urge this Court to deny the
Petition for Rehearing as we feel that all matters
presented have heretofore been fully considered by
the Court.
Respectfully submitted,
CHARLES WELCH, JR.
Attorney for Wasatch
Construction Company,
and the State Insurance
Fund
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